Security Standards
The security practices DTC follows for itself and every client, and the baseline we commit to. Products are named as what we use today; the practice and the baseline are the standard. Industry differences (patch speed, platforms, evidence) are in How the Pillars Work — Baselines & Industry Profiles.
Principles
- One of each, deployed by us. One EDR, one anti-malware engine, one remote-access path. A second security agent fights the first — duplicated kernel filters, mutual quarantine, hours lost finding it.
- Converged, not configured once. Every control is re-applied on a schedule and reports when it drifts.
- Report the gap. If a control can't be applied to a device, the device says so; it doesn't silently go without.
- Least privilege and short-lived access. No standing shared admin passwords; temporary accounts expire on their own.
Endpoints and servers
| Control | Practice and baseline | Today we use |
|---|---|---|
| EDR / MDR | Managed detection and response with a 24/7 SOC on every managed workstation and server. An unhealthy or missing agent alerts. Vendor-bundled security software is removed from purchase quotes. | Blackpoint Cyber |
| Anti-malware | One anti-malware engine with real-time protection always on, and per-client exclusions managed centrally rather than by hand on a device. | Microsoft Defender Antivirus |
| Disk encryption | OS drives encrypted, recovery key escrowed to the directory before encryption begins. Unprotected or keyless drives alert. | BitLocker |
| Boot integrity | Secure Boot on wherever the firmware supports it; machines that can't are reported. | OEM firmware tooling (Dell today) |
| Application control | Executables launched from users' download locations are blocked once a client has been through audit mode. | Windows AppLocker |
| Unapproved remote tools | Only DTC-sanctioned remote-access and RMM tools are allowed; others are found and removed. | RMM-driven shadow-IT detection |
| Local admin | Unique, rotated local admin password per device; temporary build account that removes itself. | LAPS from the RMM — Credential Standard |
| Patching | Everything we manage is patched on its industry profile's schedule. | RMM patch policies |
Network
| Control | Practice and baseline | Today we use |
|---|---|---|
| Firewall & IPS | A managed next-generation firewall at every site, intrusion prevention on every VLAN in block mode. | UniFi gateways |
| DNS filtering | Every DNS query goes through a filtering resolver — at the firewall on site, and through a roaming agent on laptops for clients with DNS filtering. | DNSFilter or Cloudflare 1.1.1.1 |
| Segmentation | Devices separated by role, guests isolated, unused switch ports disabled or on a blackhole VLAN. | Network Architecture |
| Remote access | Zero-trust access per client instead of traditional VPN. | Cloudflare Zero Trust (WARP) |
Every mail domain we manage uses SPF and DKIM together so DMARC passes — see Email Address Architecture.
Logging and detection
- Firewall and security logs go to a SIEM where the client has one (today: Blumira); otherwise they are retained on the device.
- SaaS audit logs (M365, Google Workspace) are monitored by Cloud MDR on every managed client, with identity detection and response and automated account locking (today: Blackpoint Cloud MDR; DTC does not use SaaS Alerts, Nate, 2026-11-20).
- Government-contractor clients get a SIEM and recurring log, vulnerability and patch reviews as part of the service.
Third-party tooling and incidents
- No vendor or third-party tooling on a production server without an isolated VM, senior-technician approval and client notice (decided by Nate, 2026-09-29).
- An isolated machine stays online long enough to verify the threat is gone before it is wiped (same decision).
- Procedures: Security Incident Response Playbook, Vulnerability Remediation SOP.
Open
- Anti-malware exclusions source of truth — direction agreed 2026-09-29 (client → location → device inheritance from the RMM, built from installed software); not built yet.